Fall 2016

### CODEBREAKER CHALLENGE 4

### Challenge Scenario

Terrorists have recently developed a new type of remotely controlled Improvised Explosive Device (IED), making it harder for the U.S. Armed Forces to detect and ultimately prevent roadside bomb attacks against troops deployed overseas.

 Your task is to develop the capability to disarm the IEDs remotely and permanently render them inoperable without the risk of civilian casualties.

### The Challenge

- There are six different levels to this challenge:
  - Task 1: Compute hash and identify IED ports
  - Task 2: Refine IED network traffic signature
  - Task 3: Decrypt IED key file
  - Task 4: Disarm the IED with the key
  - Task 5: Disarm an IED without a key
  - Task 6: Permanently disable any IED

### The Challenge (cont.)

- Challenge materials and instructions can be found at <a href="https://codebreaker.ltsnet.net">https://codebreaker.ltsnet.net</a>
- Register for an account with your .edu email address

### Reverse Engineering Tips

- Examine strings in the binary using IDA
  - Look for clues that relate to the functionality you are trying to find / reverse
  - Utilize IDA xrefs to find code that references the string(s) of interest
  - Utilize symbols (e.g., function names) to help determine what a section of code does
- Try setting debugger breakpoints to help RE code
  - Single-step after hitting a breakpoint and see how the values in registers/memory change
  - Look for the result of interesting computations. You can sometimes get the data you need from memory
- Leverage online resources, e.g., Intel manuals, RE lectures, etc. for help on reverse-engineering

### Network Traffic Analysis

- Great tools available packet analysis:
  - Wireshark: cross platform, parsers for many protocols
  - Microsoft Message Analyzer: Great features for active capturing on Windows
- Available features/functionality:
  - Display filters to focus in on traffic
  - TCP stream following
  - Extract files from packet payloads
  - Dissecting custom protocols (Lua script interface)
  - Traffic statistics/characterization

### Technical Walkthrough

 2015 Codebreaker Challenge on Windows using IDA Pro Demo

 This binary can be downloaded from https://codebreaker.ltsnet.net/resources

### 2015 Backstory

- NSA has discovered that the leadership of a terrorist organization is using a new method of communicating secret messages to its operatives in the field
- Intelligence suggests that each member is provided a program that can be used to read the messages, and that a customized cryptographic implementation is used to generate a public/private key pair, which is then used to authenticate messages from leadership

### 2015 Backstory (2)

 A copy of the program belonging to a highranking operative has been recovered ...

 Your mission is to reverse-engineer this software and develop capabilities to exploit the secret messaging component

### 2015 Challenge

- Four different levels or "tasks" to this challenge problem
  - Task 1: Execute program hidden functionality
  - Task 2: Bypass an authentication check
  - Task 3: Create an encoder program
  - Task 4: Spoof a message to a high-value target

### 2015 Challenge – Task 1

 We need your help with decoding a message that we've captured ... trigger the hidden functionality and decode the secret message

#### Provided:

- tier1\_key.pem
- tier1\_msg.txt
- codebreaker3.exe

### tier1\_key.pem

```
----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----
MIGFMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC4k1yyzvV9aBX77ummrzXb1e0Q
9N0ugYzdi9IyathdP2D3vZ5n3i+hP9kQqK/QnxXtbFRbVD3/X2U50n6oHDUW2bSA
XdC7TDKwbn5y0OvuMM9AaybULjOAax+1VrY8vwCs0Gq+SsVkm6G0nQGOcBUXZf08
MG/hEC6bV/22FR+1JQIDAQAB
----END PUBLIC KEY----
```

### tier1\_msg.txt

At this the Sheriff looked grave and all the guild of butchers too, so that none laughed but Robin, only some winked slyly at each other.

"Come, fill us some sack!" cried Robin. "Let us e'er be merry while we may, for man is but dust, and he hath but a span to live here till the worm getteth him, as our good gossip Swanthold sayeth; so let life be merry while it lasts, say I. Nay, never look down i' the mouth, Sir Sheriff. Who knowest but that thou mayest catch Robin Hood yet, if thou drinkest less good sack and Malmsey, and bringest down the fat about thy paunch and the dust from out thy brain. Be merry, man."

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### Running the program


```
Command Prompt
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\challenge>codebreaker3.exe --help
Help:
--debug true : Show debugging information
--help : Show this help message
--symbol <symbol> : The ticker symbol to reference
--action <action> :
    'open' for the days opening price
    'low' for the days lowest price
    'high' for the days highest price
    'last' for the last price
--symbol and --action are required arguments
Stock Information Powered by Yahoo!
C:\challenge>
```

# Running the program (2)


```
Command Prompt
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\challenge>codebreaker3.exe --help
Help:
--debug true : Show debugging information
--help : Show this help message
--symbol <symbol> : The ticker symbol to reference
--action <action> :
    'open' for the days opening price
    'low' for the days lowest price
    'high' for the days highest price
    'last' for the last price
--symbol and --action are required arguments
Stock Information Powered by Yahoo!
C:\challenge>codebreaker3.exe --symbol GOOG --action last
'last' info for 'GOOG': 783.22
C:\challenge>
```

#### Disassemble

Disassemble the Codebreaker3 binary



### Disassemble (2)



### Observe Strings

- Observe the strings that show up in IDA
  - Click Views->Open Subviews->Strings
  - You should see the strings that are displayed when you run the program


```
--symbol <symbol>: The ticker symbol to reference
```

--action <action>:

--symbol and --action are required arguments

Stock information powered by Yahoo!

## Observe Strings (2)



# Observe Strings (3)

Strings window				x		
Address	Length	Type	String	^		
's' .rdata:0051E1A7	00000019	C	Invalid (failed check 5)			
's' .rdata:0051E1C0	00000012	C	SHA224_Init error			
's' .rdata:0051E1D2	00000014	C	SHA224_Update error			
's' .rdata:0051E1E6	00000013	C	SHA224_Final error			
's' .rdata:0051E1F9	0000001D	C	*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****			
's' .rdata:0051E216	0000000D	C	Message: %s\n			
's' .rdata:0051E223	00000019	C	Invalid (failed check 6)			
's' .rdata:0051E23C	0000001F	C	!!!!!SIGNATURE IS INVALID!!!!!			
's' .rdata:0051E25C	00000026	C	decoder : Enter secret message mode			
's' .rdata:0051E282	00000015	C	secret-messenger.exe			
's' .rdata:0051E297	00000012	C	Debugging enabled			
's' .rdata:0051E2A9	00000019	C	Failed binary name check			
's' .rdata:0051E2C2	00000006	C	Help:			
's' .rdata:0051E2C8	0000002A	C	debug true : Show debugging information			
's' .rdata:0051E2F4	00000020	C	help : Show this help message			
's' .rdata:0051E314	00000033	C	symbol <symbol> : The ticker symbol to reference</symbol>			
's' .rdata:0051E347	00000015	C	action <action> :</action>			
's' .rdata:0051E35C	00000026	C	'open' for the days opening price			
's' .rdata:0051E384	00000025	C	'low' for the days lowest price			
's' .rdata:0051E3AC	00000026	C	'high' for the days highest price			
's' .rdata:0051E3D2	0000001E	C	'last' for the last price			
's' .rdata:0051E3F0	0000002E	C	\nsymbol andaction are required arguments			
's' .rdata:0051E420	00000025	C	\nStock Information Powered by Yahoo!	V		
<				+		
Line 10 of 3881						

# Observe Strings (4)

Strings window				x		
Address	Length	Туре	String	^		
's' .rdata:0051E1A7	00000019	С	Invalid (failed check 5)			
's' .rdata:0051E1C0	00000012	C	SHA224_Init error			
's' .rdata:0051E1D2	00000014	C	SHA224_Update error			
's' .rdata:0051E1E6	00000013	C	SHA224_Final error			
's' .rdata:0051E1F9	0000001D	C	*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****			
's' .rdata:0051E216	0000000D	C	Message: %s\n			
's' .rdata:0051E223	00000019	C	Invalid (failed check 6)			
's' .rdata:0051E23C	0000001F	C	IIIII			
's' .rdata:0051E25C	00000026	-	decoder : Enter secret message mode			
's' .rdata:0051E282	00000015	C	secret-messenger.exe			
's' .rdata:0051E297	00000012	C	Debugging enabled			
's' .rdata:0051E2A9	00000019		Failed binary name check			
's' .rdata:0051E2C2	00000006	С	Ficipi			
's' .rdata:0051E2C8	0000002A	C	debug true : Show debugging information			
's' .rdata:0051E2F4	00000020	C	help : Show this help message			
's' .rdata:0051E314	00000033	C	symbol <symbol> : The ticker symbol to reference</symbol>			
's' .rdata:0051E347	00000015	C	action <action> :</action>			
's' .rdata:0051E35C	00000026	C	'open' for the days opening price			
's' .rdata:0051E384	00000025	C	'low' for the days lowest price			
's' .rdata:0051E3AC	00000026	C	'high' for the days highest price			
's' .rdata:0051E3D2	0000001E	C	'last' for the last price			
's' .rdata:0051E3F0	0000002E	C	\nsymbol andaction are required arguments			
's' .rdata:0051E420	00000025	С	\nStock Information Powered by Yahoo!	V		
<				>		
Line 10 of 3881						

# Running the program (3)

```
Command Prompt
--help : Show this help message
--symbol <symbol> : The ticker symbol to reference
--action <action> :
    'open' for the days opening price
    'low' for the days lowest price
    'high' for the days highest price
    'last' for the last price
--symbol and --action are required arguments
Stock Information Powered by Yahoo!
C:\challenge>codebreaker3.exe --symbol GOOG --action last
'last' info for 'GOOG': 783.22
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>codebreaker3.exe --decoder
Failed binary name check
C:\challenge>
```

# Observe Strings (4)

Strings window				3	x	
Address	Length	Туре	String	1	_	
's' .rdata:0051E1A7	00000019	С	Invalid (failed check 5)			
's' .rdata:0051E1C0	00000012	C	SHA224_Init error			
's' .rdata:0051E1D2	00000014	C	SHA224_Update error			
's' .rdata:0051E1E6	00000013	C	SHA224_Final error			
's' .rdata:0051E1F9	0000001D	C	*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****			
's' .rdata:0051E216	0000000D	C	Message: %s\n			
's' .rdata:0051E223	00000019	C	Invalid (failed check 6)			
's' .rdata:0051E23C	0000001F	C	IIIII			
's' .rdata:0051E25C	00000026	C	decoder : Enter secret message mode			
's' .rdata:0051E282	00000015	C	secret-messenger.exe			
's' .rdata:0051E297	00000012	C	Debugging enabled			
's' .rdata:0051E2A9	00000019		Failed binary name check			
's' .rdata:0051E2C2	00000006	С	Helps			
's' .rdata:0051E2C8	0000002A	C	debug true : Show debugging information			
's' .rdata:0051E2F4	00000020	C	help : Show this help message			
's' .rdata:0051E314	00000033	C	symbol <symbol> : The ticker symbol to reference</symbol>			
's' .rdata:0051E347	00000015	C	action <action> :</action>			
's' .rdata:0051E35C	00000026	C	'open' for the days opening price			
's' .rdata:0051E384	00000025	C	'low' for the days lowest price			
's' .rdata:0051E3AC	00000026	C	'high' for the days highest price			
's' .rdata:0051E3D2	0000001E	C	'last' for the last price			
's' .rdata:0051E3F0	0000002E	C	\nsymbol andaction are required arguments			
's' .rdata:0051E420	00000025	C	\nStock Information Powered by Yahoo!	4	,	
<				>		
Line 10 of 3881						

# Failed Binary Name Check

```
IDA View-A
                                db 'Message: %s',OAh,O ; DATA XREF: tier2+3CDTo
.rdata:0051E216 aMessageS
                                                        : tier2+49F1o
.rdata:0051E216
.rdata:0051E223 ; char aInvalidFailedC[]
.rdata:0051E223 aInvalidFailedC db 'Invalid (failed check 6)',0
.rdata:0051E223
                                                        ; DATA XREF: tier2:loc 401E93fo
.rdata:0051E23C ; char aSignatureIsInv[]
.rdata:0051E23C aSignatureIsInv db '!!!!!SIGNATURE IS INVALID!!!!!.0
                                                        ; DATA XREF: tier2+48FTo
.rdata:0051E23C
                                                        : tier2+4AB1o
.rdata:0051E23C
.rdata:0051E25B ; char options
.rdata:0051E25B options
                                                        ; DATA XREF: main+7Efo
                                db 0
                                                        : main+2711o
.rdata:0051E25B
.rdata:0051E25C ; char aDecoderEnterSe[]
.rdata:0051E25C aDecoderEnterSe db '--decoder : Enter secret message mode',0
                                                         ; DATA XREF: main:loc 51B917<sup>†</sup>o
.rdata:0051E25C
.rdata:0051E25C
                                                         : main:loc 51BA51†o
.rdata:0051E282 aSecretMessenge db 'secret-messenger.exe',0 ; DATA XREF: main+1C41o
.rdata:0051E297 ; char aDebuggingEnabl[]
.rdata:0051E297 aDebuggingEnabl db 'Debugging enabled',0 ; DATA XREF: main+EATo
                                                     ; main+306↑o
.rdata:0051E297
.rdata:0051E2A9 ; char aFailedBinaryNa[]
.rdata:0051E2A9 aFailedBinaryNa db 'Failed binary name check',0
.rdata:0051E2A9
                                                        ; DATA XREF: main:loc 51B9A6To
.rdata:0051E2C2 ; char aHelp[]
.rdata:0051E2C2 aHelp
                                db 'Help:',0 ; DATA XREF: main:loc 51B887<sup>†</sup>o
.rdata:0051E2C8 ; char aDebugTrueShowD[]
.rdata:0051E2C8 aDebugTrueShowD db '--debug true : Show debugging information',0
0011C65C 0051E25C: .rdata:aDecoderEnterSe (Synchronized with Hex View-1)
```

# Failed Binary Name Check (2)

```
IDA View-A
.rdata:0051E216 aMessageS
                                db 'Message: %s',OAh,O ; DATA XREF: tier2+3CDTo
                                                         ; tier2+49F1o
.rdata:0051E216
.rdata:0051E223 ; char aInvalidFailedC[]
.rdata:0051E223 aInvalidFailedC db 'Invalid (failed check 6)',0
.rdata:0051E223
                                                         ; DATA XREF: tier2:loc 401E93To
.rdata:0051E23C ; char aSignatureIsInv[]
.rdata:0051E23C aSignatureIsInv db '!!!!!SIGNATURE IS INVALID!!!!!.0
                                                         ; DATA XREF: tier2+48FTo
.rdata:0051E23C
                                                         : tier2+4AB1o
.rdata:0051E23C
.rdata:0051E25B ; char options
.rdata:0051E25B options
                                                         ; DATA XREF: main+7E↑o
                                db 0
                                                         : main+2711o
.rdata:0051E25B
.rdata:0051E25C ; char aDecoderEnterSe[]
.rdata:0051E25C aDecoderEnterSe db '--decoder : Enter secret message mode',0
                                                         ; DATA XREF: main:loc 51B917<sup>†</sup>o
.rdata:0051E25C
.rdata:0051E25C
                                                          main:loc 51BA51†o
.rdata:0051E282 aSecretMessenge db 'secret-messenger.exe',0 ; DATA XREF: main+1C4<sup>†</sup>o
.rdata:0051E297 ; char aDebuggingEnabl[]
.rdata:0051E297 aDebuggingEnabl db 'Debugging enabled',0 ; DATA XREF: main+EAÎo
                                                         ; main+3061o
.rdata:0051E297
.rdata:0051E2A9 ; char aFailedBinaryNa[]
.rdata:0051E2A9 aFailedBinaryNa db 'Failed binary name check',0
.rdata:0051E2A9
                                                         ; DATA XREF: main:loc 51B9A6†o
.rdata:0051E2C2 ; char aHelp[]
                                db 'Help:',0
.rdata:0051E2C2 aHelp
                                                         ; DATA XREF: main:10c 51B887fo
.rdata:0051E2C8 ; char aDebugTrueShowD[]
.rdata:0051E2C8 aDebugTrueShowD db '--debug true : Show debugging information',0
0011C65C 0051E25C: .rdata:aDecoderEnterSe (Synchronized with Hex View-1)
```

### Double-click Reference

- You should now be looking at disassembled x86 code
  - We just leveraged the fact that in order to use "Failed binary name check" in the program, the code had to reference the address in the data section of the program where the string was stored.
- Using xrefs in IDA is a quick and easy way to find interesting code sections

### Double-click Reference (2)

```
loc_51B9A6: ; CODE XREF: _main+1D2j ; _main+29Aj

mov dword ptr [esp], offset "Failed binary name check" call _puts mov dword ptr [esp], 1 call _exit
```

### Double-click Reference (3)

```
dword ptr [esp+8], 15h
mov
        [esp+4], edi
mov
        dword ptr [esp], offset "secret-messenger.exe"
mov
call
        _memcmp
     eax, eax
test
        short loc_51B9A6 ; Previous code block
jnz
So, in C:
if(0 != memcmp( <edi>, "secret-messenger.exe", 21) ) {
    puts("Failed binary name check"); exit(1); }
```

### Double-click Reference (4)

```
; int main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
...
mov    ebx, [ebp+argv]
...
mov    eax, [ebx]
mov    [esp], eax    ; path
call    _basename
mov    [esp], eax    ; char *
mov    edi, eax
```

argv holds the program arguments. For our invocation, argv will be:

['C:\challenge\codebreaker3.exe', '--decoder']

So, here, edi is a pointer to "codebreaker3.exe"

### Double-click Reference (5)

```
So, in C:

if(0 != memcmp( basename(argv[0]), "secret-messenger.exe", 21) ) {

puts("Failed binary name check"); exit(1); }
```

# Running the program (4)

```
Command Prompt
Stock Information Powered by Yahoo!
C:\challenge>codebreaker3.exe --symbol GOOG --action last
'last' info for 'GOOG': 783.22
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>codebreaker3.exe --decoder
Failed binary name check
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>copy codebreaker3.exe secret-messenger.exe
        1 file(s) copied.
C:\challenge>secret-messenger.exe --decoder
Missing required parameter. Run with --help for more info
C:\challenge>
```

# Running the program (5)

```
Command Prompt
    'open' for the days opening price
    'low' for the days lowest price
    'high' for the days highest price
    'last' for the last price
--symbol and --action are required arguments
Stock Information Powered by Yahoo!
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>secret-messenger.exe --decoder --symbol tier1
_key.pem --action tier1_msg.txt
*****SIGNATURE IS VALID****
Message: Meet at 22:00 tomorrow at our secure location. C
ome alone, and do not tell anyone - this meeting is sensit
ive, as leadership will be present. To authenticate yours
elf, mention the pass code xukmefnooi5mckyr74b8 at the doo
*****SIGNATURE IS VALID****
C:\challenge>
```

### Task 1 Complete!

- Fairly straight forward
- Just looking at the strings may have been enough to get you through this
- --decoder : Enter secret messaging mode
  - secret-messenger.exe

... on to Task 2!

### 2015 Challenge – Task 2

Through SIGINT we have collected a new message file - this one appears to have been sent to a field operative ... We believe that this message may contain actionable intelligence, so please report back with the message contents as soon as possible

#### Provided:

- tier2\_key.pem
- tier2\_msg.txt

# Running the program (6)

```
Command Prompt
Stock Information Powered by Yahoo!
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>secret-messenger.exe --decoder --symbol tier1
_key.pem --action tier1_msg.txt
Message: Meet at 22:00 tomorrow at our secure location. C
ome alone, and do not tell anyone - this meeting is sensit
ive, as leadership will be present. To authenticate yours
elf, mention the pass code xukmefnooi5mckyr74b8 at the doo
*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>
C:\challenge>secret-messenger.exe --decoder --symbol tier2
_key.pem --action tier2_msg.txt
Invalid (failed check 4)
C:\challenge>
```

# Invalid (Failed check 4)

```
loc_401ED3: ; CODE XREF: _tier2+1E6j

mov dword ptr [esp], offset "Invalid (failed check 4)"

call _puts

mov dword ptr [esp], 1

call _exit
```

### On to \_tier2

Starting near where we left off, main calls \_tier2:

```
mov edx, [esp+20h]; key file path mov eax, [esp+1Ch]; text file path call _tier2
```

#### Inside \_tier2

```
push
        eax
        eax, 211B8h
mov
call
           chkstk ms
sub
        esp, eax
        eax, [esp+211B8h]
mov
lea
        ebx, [ebp+var 20016]
        ecx, [ebp+var_21194]
lea
        [ebp+var 21194], OFFFEh
MOV
        esi, eax
MOV
        eax, edx
MOV
        edx, ebx
mov
call
        get file contents
        ecx, [ebp+var 21190]
lea
        eax, esi
mov
lea
        edx, [ebp+var 21016]
        [ebp+var_21190], 1000h
mov
call
        get file contents
1ea
        eax, [ebp+var 10017]
mov
        dword ptr [esp+8], OFFFFh ; size t
        dword ptr [esp+4], 0 ; int
mov
                         ; void *
        [esp], eax
MOV
call
        memset
        dword ptr [esp+4], offset asc 51E13A ; "\n"
mov
        [esp], ebx
                         ; char *
mov
call
        strtok
test
        eax, eax
mov
        ecx, eax
įΖ
        1oc 401E72
        ebx, ebx
xor
        edi, edi
xor
        esi, 7
mov
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (2)

```
push
        eax
mov
        eax, 211B8h
call
          chkstk ms
                                 eax: key file path
sub
        esp, eax
mov
        eax, [esp+211B8h]
                                 edx: text file path
lea
        ebx, [ebp+var 20016]
        ecx, [ebp+var 21194]
1ea
        [ebp+var 21194], OFFFEh
mov
        esi, eax
MOV
                                 Two calls to _get_file_contents
        eax, edx
MOV
        edx, ebx
mov
                                 to read both files into buffers
        qet file contents
call
        ecx, [ebp+var 21190]
lea
        eax, esi
mov
lea
        edx, [ebp+var 21016]
        [ebp+var_21190], 1000h
MOV
call
       get file contents
        eax, [ebp+var 10017]
lea
mov
        dword ptr [esp+8], OFFFFh ; size t
        dword ptr [esp+4], 0; int
mov
        [esp], eax
                        ; void *
mov
call.
        memset
        dword ptr [esp+4], offset asc 51E13A; "\n"
mov
        [esp], ebx
                        ; char *
mov
call
        strtok
test
        eax, eax
                                  Initial call to strtok to
mov
        ecx, eax
įΖ
        1oc 401E72
                                  tokenize the file by line
       ebx, ebx
xor
        edi, edi
xor
        esi, 7
mov
```

# Inside \_tier2 (3)

```
loc 401AA9:
                mov
                         [esp], ecx
                         [ebp+var_21190], ecx
                mov
                call
                         strlen
                         ecx, [ebp+var_2119C]
                 MOV
                         edx, eax
                mov
                sub
                         edx, 1
                 įs –
                         short loc 401AE6
                         eax, byte ptr [ecx+eax-1]
                MOVZX
                         al, 20h
                CMP
                         short loc 401ADE
                 įΖ
                         1oc 401E65
                 jmp
loc 401AD2:
                         eax, byte ptr [ecx+edx]
                 MOVZX
                         al, 9
                CMP
                         1oc 401E40
                 jnz
loc 401ADE:
                 sub
                         edx, 1
                         edx, OFFFFFFFh
                CMP
                 jnz
                         short loc 401AD2
loc 401AE6:
                         eax, byte ptr [ecx+edx+1]
                MOVZX
                         al, al
                test
                 jz
                         1oc_401E15
                 add
                         edx, ecx
                         short 1oc_401B16
                 jmp
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (4)

```
loc 401AA9:
                                                   Calculates the
                       [esp], ecx
               mov
                       [ebp+var 2119C], ecx
               mov
                                                   length of the
               call
                       strlen
                       ecx, [ebp+var_2119C]
               MOV
                                                   current line
                       edx, eax
               MOV
               sub
                       edx, 1
               js:
                       short loc 401AE6
                       eax ....te ptr [ecx+eax-1]
               MOVZX
                       al, 20h
               CMP
                       short foc 401ADE
               įΖ
                       1oc 401E65
               jmp
                                               Skips any tabs (0x9)
                                               and space (0x20)
loc 401AD2:
                       eax_bute ptr [ecx+edx]
               MOVZX
                                               characters at the
               CMP
                       1oc 401E40
               jnz
                                               end of the line
loc 401ADE:
               sub
                       edx, 1
                       edx, OFFFFFFFh
               CMP
                                                 Effectively builds
               jnz
                       short loc 401AD2
                                                 an index to the
loc 401AE6:
                                                 whitespace at
                       eax, byte ptr [ecx+edx+1]
               MOVZX
               test
                       al, al
               įΖ
                       1oc 401E15
                                                 each line's end
               add
                       edx, ecx
                       short loc_401B16
               jmp
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (5)

```
loc 401AF7:
                                             ; CODE XREF: tier2+1081j
                  add
                           ebx, 1
                           ebx, 8
                  CMP
                  įΖ
                           short loc_401B34
loc 401AFF:
                                             ; CODE XREF: tier2+122↓j
                           <mark>edi</mark>, OFFFEh
                  CMP
                  įΖ
                           short loc 401B41
loc 401B07:
                                             ; CODE XREF: tier2+12Fij
                           edx, 1
                  add
                           eax, byte ptr [edx+1]
                  MOVZX
                  test
                           al, al
                           1oc_401E15
                  įΖ
                                             ; CODE XREF: tier2+E5<sup>†</sup>j
loc 401B16:
                           al, 20h
                  CMP
                  jnz
                           short loc 401AF7
                           ecx, esi
                  mov
                           eax, 1
                  mov
                           ecx, ebx
                  sub
                  add
                           ebx, 1
                  sh1
                           eax, cl
                           [ebp+edi+var_10017], al
                  or
                           ebx, 8
                  CMP
                  jnz
                           short loc_401AFF
loc 401B34:
                                             ; CODE XREF: tier2+ED†j
                           <mark>edi</mark>, 1
                  add
                           b1, b1
                  xor
                           edi, OFFFEh
                  CMP
                  jnz
                           short loc 401B07
```

### Inside \_tier2 (6)

```
loc 401AF7:
                                             ; CODE XREF: tier2+1081j
                  add
                           ebx, 1
                           ebx, 8
                  CMP
                  įΖ
                           short loc 401B34
loc 401AFF:
                                             ; CODE XREF: tier2+122↓j
                           <mark>edi</mark>, OFFFEh
                  CMP
                  įΖ
                           short loc 401B41
loc 401B07:
                                             ; CODE XREF: tier2+12Fij
                  add
                          edx, 1
                          eax, byte ptr [edx+1]
                  MOVZX
                  test
                           al, al
                           1oc_401E15
                  įΖ
                                                  Interprets spaces
loc 401B16:
                           al, 20h
                  CMP
                                                  as binary 1's and
                  jnz
                           short loc 401AF7
                          ecx, esi
                  mov
                                                  tabs as binary 0's
                          eax, 1
                  mov
                           ecx, ebx
                  sub
                  add
                           ebx, 1
                  sh1
                           eax, cl
                           [ebp+<mark>edi</mark>+var 10017], al
                  or
                           ebx, 8
                  CMP
                  jnz
                           short loc_401AFF
loc 401B34:
                                             ; CODE XREF: tier2+ED†j
                           <mark>edi</mark>, 1
                  add
                           b1, b1
                  xor
                           e<mark>di</mark>, OFFFEh
                  CMP
                  jnz
                           short loc 401B07
```

#### Tabs and Spaces

At this the Sheriff looked grave and all the guild of butchers too, so that none laughed but Robin, only some winked slyly at each other.

"Come, fill us some sack!" cried Robin. "Let us e'er be merry while we may, for man is but dust, and he hath but a span to live here till the worm getteth him, as our good gossip Swanthold sayeth; so let life be merry while it lasts, say I. Nay, never look down i' the mouth, Sir Sheriff. Who knowest but that thou mayest catch Robin Hood yet, if thou drinkest less good sack and Malmsey, and bringest down the fat about thy paunch and the dust from out thy brain. Be merry, man."

#### Tabs and Spaces - Revealed!

At this the Sheriff looked grave and all the guild of butchers too, so<mark>010 that none laughed but Robin, only some winked slyly at each other.011 010</mark>

"Come, fill us some sack!" cried Robin. "Let us e'er be merry while we000 may, for man is but dust, and he hath but a span to live here till the000 worm getteth him, as our good gossip Swanthold sayeth; so let life be010 merry while it lasts, say I. Nay, never look down i' the mouth, Sir101 Sheriff. Who knowest but that thou mayest catch Robin Hood yet, if thou111 drinkest less good sack and Malmsey, and bringest down the fat about thy000 paunch and the dust from out thy brain. Be merry, man."

#### Inside \_tier2 (7)

```
; size t
mov
        [esp], esi
call
        malloc
test
        eax, eax
        ebx, eax
mov
įΖ
        1oc 401EEB
        eax, [ebp+var 10017]
lea
        [esp+8], esi ; size t
MOV
        [esp+4], eax ; void *
MOV
        [esp], ebx
                        : void *
mov
call.
        memcpy
        eax, [ebp+var 21190]
MOV
CMP
        esi, 6
        [ebp+var 21194], edi
MOV
        [ebp+var 211A8], eax
MOV
jbe
        loc 401F03
        bute ptr [ebx], 4Dh
CMP
jnz
        1oc 401F7B
        eax, word ptr [ebx+3]
MOVZX
        edi, ds:__imp__ntohs@4 ; ntohs(x)
MOV
        [esp], eax ; netshort
mov
        edi : ntohs(x) : ntohs(x)
call
MOVZX
        eax, ax
        esp, 4
sub
        eax, esi
CMP.
        [ebp+var 21190], eax
MOV
ja
        loc 401F63
```

# Inside \_tier2 (8)

```
; size t
        [esp], esi
mov
call
         malloc
test
        eax, eax
        ebx, eax
mov
iz
        1oc 401EEB
        eax, [ebp+var 10017]
lea
        [esp+8], esi ; size t
mov
                     : void *
MOV
        [esp+4], eax
        [esp], ebx
                         : void *
mov
call.
        memcpy
        eax, [ebp+var 21190]
mnu
CMP
        esi, 6
        [ebp+var 21194], edi
MOV
        [ebp+var 211A8], eax
MOV
jbe.
        loc 401F03
        byte ptr [ebx], 4Dh
CMP
        1oc 401F7B
jnz
        eax, word ptr [ebx+3]
MAUZX.
        edi, ds: imp ntohs@4
mov
                    ; netshort
        [esp], eax
mov
        edi ; ntohs(x) ; ntohs(x)
call
MOVZX
        eax, ax
        esp, 4
sub
        eax, esi
CMP.
        [ebp+var 2119C], eax
mov
        1oc 401F63
ja
```

Allocates dynamic space for the decoded data and copies it in

esi: size of decoded data ebx: decoded data (heap)

#### Three compares:

- 1. data size > 6
- 2. data[0] == 'M'
- 3. data[3-4] <= data size

#### Inside \_tier2 - Fail cases

```
loc_401FO3:
       dword ptr [esp], offset "Invalid (failed check 1)"
mov
call
     _puts
mov dword ptr [esp], 1
call <u>exit</u>
loc_401F7B:
       dword ptr [esp], offset "Invalid (failed check 2)"
mov
call
    puts
mov dword ptr [esp], 1
call _exit
loc 401F63:
       dword ptr [esp], offset "Invalid (failed check 3)"
mov
call
     _puts
mov dword ptr [esp], 1
call
     exit
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (9)

```
dword ptr [esp], 88h; size t
mov
        malloc
call
        edx, [ebp+var 21190]
mov
mov
        [ebp+var 211A0], eax
1ea
        eax, [edx+1]
        [esp], eax ; size t
MOV
        malloc
call
        ecx, [ebp+var 211A0]
mov
        [ebp+var 211AC], eax
MOV
        [ecx], eax
mov
        eax, word ptr [ebx+5]
MOVZX
        [esp], eax ; netshort
mov
        edi ; ntohs(x) ; ntohs(x)
call
        esp, 4
sub
        ax, 3A2Bh
CMP
        1oc 401ED3
jnz
MOVZX
        eax. word ntr [ehx+1]
         Γes 🥫
mov
        edi
call
        edx loc 401ED3:
                                                      ; CODE XREF: tier2+1E6<sup>†</sup>i
MOVZX
                                     dword ptr [esp], offset "Invalid (failed check 4)"
                             MOV
        eax
mov
                                    _puts
                             call
sub
        esp
                                     dword ptr [esp], 1; int
                             MOV
add
        eax
                                     exit
                             call
        [eb
mov
add
        eax 5
CMP
        eax
        loc loc 401EEB:
                                                      ; CODE XREF: tier2+142<sup>†</sup>j
jnz
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (10)

```
dword ptr [esp], 88h; size t
mov
call.
        malloc
        edx, [ebp+var 21190]
mov
        [ebp+var 211A0], eax
mov
1ea
        eax, [edx+1]
        [esp], eax
                         ; size t
mov
        malloc
call
        ecx, [ebp+var 211A0]
mov
        [ebp+var 211AC], eax
mov
        [ecx], eax
mov
        eax, word ptr [ebx+5]
MOVZX
                                         The problematic compare:
        [esp], eax ; netshort
mov
        edi ; ntohs(x) ; ntohs(x)
call
                                          4. data[5-6] == 0x3A2B
        esp, 4
sub
        ax, 3A2Bh
CMP
        loc_401ED3
jnz
        eax_ word ntr [ehx+1]
MOVZX
        Γes ;
mov
        edi
call
        edx loc 401ED3:
                                                     ; CODE XREF: tier2+1E6<sup>†</sup>i
MOVZX
                                    dword ptr [esp], offset "Invalid (failed check 4)"
                            mov
        eax
mov
                                    _puts
                            call
sub
        esp
                                    dword ptr [esp], 1; int
                            mov
add
        eax
                            call
                                    exit
        [eb
mov
        eax 5
add
        eax
CMD
                                                     ; CODE XREF: _tier2+1421j
        loc loc 401EEB:
jnz
```

#### From the Task 2 backstory

 "Through SIGINT we have collected a new message file - this one appears to have been sent to a field operative"


The first message didn't have this problem...

 Messages must have an ID associating them to a given operative.


#### We have the binary...

- So bypass the check dynamically!
- Set a breakpoint at the comparison in IDA
  - Click the circle to the left of that line of code
- Prepare the debugger
  - Debugger -> Set Debugger (Local Win32 debugger)
  - Debugger -> Process Options...
  - Specify the program parameters for Task 2 from earlier
  - Start Process...

#### At the breakpoint



#### The result:



#### Task 2 Complete!

 Required either bypassing the check as we demonstrated, or modifying the binary / message

... on to Task 3!

#### 2015 Challenge – Task 3

The copy of the program you have is only capable of decoding secret messages and lacks the ability to encode new messages to other operatives. We need this capability in order to infiltrate the terrorist network and send encoded messages...

#### Provided:

- A message to encode
- A text file to encode the message into
- A public/private key pair

#### Recap - What we know so far

- Messages are encoded using tabs and spaces
- Once decoded, they have certain properties:
  - data[] size > 6
  - data[o] == 'M'
  - data[3-4] <= data size</p>
  - data[5-6] == 0x3A2B



- So, message must take the form:
  - 'M' | ???? ???? | length ? | 0x3A 0x2B | ????????

### Inside \_tier2 (11)

```
MOVZX
        eax, word ptr [ebx+1]
mov
        [esp], eax
                          ; netshort
call
        edi ; ntohs(x) ; ntohs(x)
        edx, ax
MOVZX
        eax, [ebp+var 21190]
mov
sub
        esp, 4
add
        eax, 7
        [ebp+var 211B0], eax
mov
add
        eax, edx
CMP
        eax, esi
jnz
        1oc 401F1B
1ea
        eax, [ebx+7]
mov
        esi, 100h
lea
        edi, [ebp+var 21116]
        [ebp+var 211A4], eax
MOV
mov
        eax, edi
        al, 2
test
jnz
        1oc 401E4D
                          ; CODE XREF: _tier2+450jj
        ecx, esi
mov
xor
        eax, eax
        ecx, 2
shr
and
        esi, 2
rep stosd
jΖ
        short loc 401C55
        word ptr [edi], 0
mov
                          ; CODE XREF: _tier2+23E<sup>†</sup>j
1ea
        eax, [ebp+var 2118C]
mov
        [esp+OCh], eax ; int
        eax, [ebp+var 21116]
lea
         [esp+8], eax
                          ; int
mov
```

# Inside \_tier2 (12)

```
eax, word ptr [ebx+1]
MOVZX
                                   esi: size of decoded data
                        ; netshort
mov
        [esp], eax
call
        edi ; ntohs(x)
                        ; ntohs(x)
       edx, ax
MOVZX
                                   A 5th comparison:
       eax, [ebp+var 21190]
mov
sub
       esp, 4
       eax, 7
                                   data size == data[3-4] +
add
        [ebp+var 21180], eax
mov
add
       eax, edx
                                                    data[1-2] + 7
CMP
       eax, esi
       10c_401F1B
jnz
1ea
       eax, [ebx+7]
       esi, 100h
mov
                                   Stores off data[3-4] + 7
       edi, [ebp+var 21116]
1ea
        [ebp+var 211A4], eax
mov
       eax, edi
                                   (used as an index later)
mov
        al, 2
test
jnz
       1oc 401E4D
                        ; code XREF: Stores off a pointer to
       ecx, esi
mov
                                    data[7]
xor
       eax, eax
       ecx, 2
shr
and
       esi. 2
rep stosd
įΖ
       short loc 401C55
       word ptr [edi], 0
mov
                        ; CODE XREF: tier2+23E<sup>†</sup>j
1ea
        eax, [ebp+var 2118C]
        [esp+0Ch], eax ; int
mov
        eax, [ebp+var 21116]
lea
        [esp+8], eax
                        ; int
mov
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (13)

```
1ea
        eax, [ebp+var_2118C]
        [esp+OCh], eax ; int
MOV
lea
        eax, [ebp+var 21116]
        [esp+8], eax
MOV
                         ; int
        eax, [ebp+var_211B0]
MOV
        esi, [ebp+var_21188]
1ea
        [esp+4], edx
                         ; int
MOV
        [ebp+var_2118C], 100h
MOV
        eax, ebx
add
                         ; void *
        [esp], eax
MOV
call
         Base64Decode
        [esp], esi
mov
call
        SHA224 Init
        eax, 1
CMP
jnz
        1oc 401E7B
        eax, [ebp+var 2119C]
MOV
        [esp], esi
MOV
        [esp+8], eax
MOV
        eax, [ebp+var_211A4]
mov
        [esp+4], eax
MOV
call
        SHA224 Update
CMP
        eax, 1
        loc_401F4B
jnz
lea
        eax, [ebp+var 10017]
        [esp+4], esi
mov
        [esp], eax
MOV
call
        SHA224 Final
        eax, 1
CMP
jnz
        loc 401F33
        eax, [ebp+var_211A8]
mov
        [ebp+var 21188], 0
MOV
        [esp+4], eax
MOV
                         ; int
        eax, [ebp+var 21016]
lea
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (14)

```
1ea
       eax, [ebp+var 2118C]
       [esp+0Ch], eax ; int
mov
lea
       eax, [ebp+var 21116]
       [esp+8], eax
mov
       eax, [ebp+var 21180]
mov
                                  Computes a pointer to
lea
       esi, [ebp+var 21188]
       [esp+4], edx
                      ; int
mov
                                  data[ (data[3-4] + 7) ]
       [ebp+var 2118C], 100h
mov
       eax, ebx
add
                                  and passes it to Base64Decode
                      ; void *
       [esp], eax
mov
call
        Base64Decode
       [esp], esi
MOV
call
       SHA224 Init
                                 Calls to the SHA224 standard
       eax, 1
CMP
jnz
       1oc 401E7B
       eax, [ebp+var 21190]
mov
                                  hashing functions
       [esp], esi
MOV
       [esp+8], eax
mov
       eax, [ebp+var 211A4]
mov
       [esp+4], eax
MOV
                                  Passes data[7] pointer as 2nd
call
       SHA224 Update
CMP
       eax, 1
                                  arg to _Sha224_Update
       1oc 401F4B
jnz
1ea
       eax, [ebp+var 10017]
       [esp+4], esi
mov
       [esp], eax
MOV
                                  Passes data[3-4] as 3rd
call
       SHA224 Final
       eax, 1
CMP
jnz
       loc 401F33
                                  arg to Sha224 Update
       eax, [ebp+var 211A8]
mov
       [ebp+var 21188], 0
mov
       [esp+4], eax
mov
       eax, [ebp+var_21016]
lea
```

#### SHA224\_Update

```
SHA224_Update(
SHA224_CTX *context,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t len);
```

```
SHA224_Update(
CTX_obj,
pointer to data[7],
data[3-4]);
```

#### Piecing together the clues

- data[3-4] length of data starting at data[7] (that gets hashed)
- data[1-2] length of the remaining data
  - data size == data[3-4] + data[1-2] + 7
- data after data1 is base64 decoded

```
'M' | len data2 | len data1 | 0x3A2B | data1 | data2 data1 = ???

data2 = b64( ??? )
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (15)

```
mov
        [esp+4], eax
                         ; int
1ea
        eax, [ebp+var 21016]
        [esp], eax
                         ; char *
mov
call
         BIO new mem buf
        [esp+4], esi
MOV
        dword ptr [esp+0Ch], 0
MOV
        dword ptr [esp+8], 0
MOV
mov
        [esp], eax
        PEM read bio RSA PUBKEY
call
        dword ptr [esp+10h], 80h; int
MOV
        dword ptr [esp+8], 1Ch ; size_t
MOV
        dword ptr [esp], 2A3h ; int
MOV
        [ebp+var 21188], eax
MOV
        [esp+14h], eax ; int
mov
        eax, [ebp+var 21116]
1ea
        [esp+0Ch], eax ; int
mov
        eax, [ebp+var 10017]
lea
        [esp+4], eax ; void *
mov
        RSA verify
call
        esi, [ebp+var 211A0]
MOV
        edi, [ebp+var 211A4]
mov
CMP
        eax, 1
sbb
        eax, eax
not
        eax
and
        eax, 237EEAD6h
        [esi+84h], eax
MOV
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (16)

```
MOV
       [esp+4], eax ; int
1ea
       eax, [ebp+var 21016]
                                     Creates a new
       [esp], eax
                      ; char *
mov
call
        BIO new mem buf
                                     RSA PUBKEY object
       [esp+4], esi
mov
       dword ptr [esp+0Ch], 0
mov
                                     from the key file that
       dword ptr [esp+8], 0
MOV
mov
       [esp], eax
                                     was read in
call
       PEM read bio RSA PUBKEY
       dword ptr [esp+10h], 80h; int
MOV
       dword ptr [esp+8], 1Ch ; size_t
MOV
       dword ptr [esp], 2A3h ; int
MOV
                                     RSA_verify(
       [ebp+var 21188], eax
mov
       [esp+14h], eax ; int
mov
                                        0x2A3,
       eax, [ebp+var 21116]
1ea
       [esp+0Ch], eax ; int
mov
                                        SHA224 hash,
1ea
       eax, [ebp+var 10017]
                      ; void *
       [esp+4], eax
mov
                                        0x1C,
call
       RSA verify
       esi, [ebp+var 211A0]
MOV
       edi, [ebp+var 211A4]
                                        b64 decoded data,
mov
CMP
       eax, 1
sbb
       eax, eax
                                        0x80,
not
       eax
and
       eax, 237EEAD6h
                                        RSA PUBKEY obj);
       [esi+84h], eax
mov
```

#### RSA\_verify

```
RSA_verify(
int type,
unsigned char *hash,
unsigned int hash_len,
unsigned char *sigbuf,
unsigned int siglen,
RSA_verify(
0x2A3,
sha224_hash,
0x1c,
b64_decoded_data,
0x80,
RSA *rsa);
RSA_PUBKEY_obj);
```

```
So,
'M' | len data2 | len data1 | 0x3A2B | data1 | data2
data1 = ???
data2 = b64( RSA_sign ( SHAZ24 ( data1 ) ) )
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (17)

```
esi, [ebp+var 211A0]
mov
        edi, [ebp+var 211A4]
mov
        eax, 1
CMD
sbb
        eax, eax
not
        eax
        eax, 237EEAD6h
and
        [esi+84h], eax
mov
        eax, [ebp+var 21190]
MOV
                         ; void *
        [esp+4], edi
MOV
        edi, [ebp+var 211AC]
mov
        [esp+8], eax
                         ; size t
mov
mov
        [esp], edi
                         ; void *
        edi, [ebp+var 21116]
lea.
call
        memcpy
        edx, [ebp+var 2118C]
mov
1ea
        eax, [esi+4]
        [esp+4], edi
                         ; void *
MOV
        edi, esi
mov
                         ; void *
        [esp], eax
mov
                         ; size t
mov
        [esp+8], edx
call
        memcpy
        esi, [esi]
mov
        eax, [ebp+var 21190]
mov
CMP
        dword ptr [edi+84h], 237EEAD6h
        byte ptr [esi+eax], 0
mov
jnz
        loc 401E93
        dword ptr [esp], offset aSignatureIsVal ; "*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****"
mov
call
        puts
        [esp+4], esi
mov
        dword ptr [esp], offset aMessageS ; "Message: %s\n"
mov
        printf
call
        dword ptr [esp], offset aSignatureIsVal ; "*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****"
mov
call
        puts
```

#### Inside \_tier2 (18)

```
esi, [ebp+var 211A0]
mov
       edi, [ebp+var 211A4]
                                 Loads pointer to data1 into edi
mov
       eax, 1
CMD
sbb
       eax, eax
not
       eax
       eax, 237EEAD6h
and
                                 Copies it into memory malloc'd
       [esi+84h], eax
mov
       eax, [ebp+var 21190]
MOV
                                 previously (pointed to by esi)
       [esp+4], edi
                       ; void *
MOV
       edi, [ebp+var 211AC]
mov
                       ; size t
       [esp+8], eax
mov
       [esp], edi
mov
                       ; void *
       edi, [ebp+var 21116]
lea.
call
       memcpy
       edx, [ebp+var 2118C]
mov
1ea
       eax, [esi+4]
                       : void *
       [esp+4], edi
MOV
mov
       edi, esi
                       ; void *
       [esp], eax
mov
                                 If RSA_verify indicates a valid
                       ; size t
mov
       [esp+8], edx
call
        memcpy
                                 signature, prints message below
       esi, [esi]
mov
       eax, [ebp+var 21190]
MOV
       dword ptr [edi+84h], 237EEAD6h
CMP
       byte ptr [esi+eax], 0
mov
jnz
       1oc 401E93
       dword ptr [esp], offset aSignatureIsVal ; "*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****"
mov
call
        puts
       [esp+4], esi
mov
       dword ptr [esp], offset aMessageS ; "Message: %s\n"
mov
       printf
call
       dword ptr [esp], offset aSignatureIsVal ; "*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****"
mov
call
        puts
```

#### We can now craft messages!



```
'M' | len data2 | len data1 | 0x3A2B | data1 | data2 data1 = message text data2 = b64( RSA_sign ( SHA224 ( data1 ) ) )
```

- Compute hash of the message text
- Compute RSA signature of message text hash using provided RSA private key
- Base64 encode the RSA signature
- Calculate lengths
- Build header
- Encode in tabs and spaces

#### Task 3 Complete!

 Required reverse engineering the algorithm and writing a complimentary solution

... on to Task 4!

#### 2015 Challenge – Task 4

- A military organization wants to make the messages appear to come from the group's leadership. ... Program binaries and keys have already been distributed throughout the terrorist organization, though, so achieving this effect must be done only via the message file.
- Craft a message that can be sent to the same high-ranking member that the message from Task 1 was originally sent to
- Provided:
  - A message to encode
  - A text file to encode the message into

# ■ The problem... No private key ☺

```
M | len data2 | len data1 | 0x3A 0x2B | data1 | data2 | data1 = message text

data2 = b64( RSA_sign ( SHA224( data1 ) ) )
```

 We have the person's public key, but computing the RSA signature requires the private key

Maybe there is a flaw we can exploit?

#### A further look ...

```
esi, [ebp+var_211A0]
mov
        edi, [ebp+var 211A4]
mov
CMP
        eax, 1
sbb
        eax, eax
not
        eax
        eax, 237EEAD6h
and
        [esi+84h], eax
mov
        eax, [ebp+var 21190]
MOV
        [esp+4], edi
MOV
        edi, [ebp+var 211AC]
mov
        [esp+8], eax
mov
MOV
        [esp], edi
        edi, [ebp+var 21116]
lea.
call
        memcpy
        edx, [ebp+var 2118C]
mov
1ea
        eax, [esi+4]
        [esp+4], edi
MOV
        edi, esi
mov
        [esp], eax
mov
mov
        [esp+8], edx
call
        memcpy
        esi, [esi]
mov
        eax, [ebp+var 21190]
mov
CMP
        dword ptr [edi+84h], 237EEAD6h
        byte ptr [esi+eax], 0
mov
jnz
        loc 401E93
        dword ptr [esp], offset aSignatureIsVal ; "*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****"
mov
call
        puts
        [esp+4], esi
mov
        dword ptr [esp], offset aMessageS ; "Message: %s\n"
mov
        printf
call
        dword ptr [esp], offset aSignatureIsVal ; "*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****"
mov
call
        puts
```

#### A further look ... (2)

```
esi, [ebp+var 211A0]
mov
                                esi = 0x88 bytes of malloc'd mem
       edi, [ebp+var 211A4]
mov
       eax, 1
CMD
sbb
       eax, eax
not
       eax
       eax, 237EEAD6h
and
                                if RSA_verify returns <= 0:
       [esi+84h], eax
mov
       eax, [ebp+var 21190]
MOV
                                   [esi+0x84] = 0
       [esp+4], edi
MOV
       edi, [ebp+var 211AC]
mov
                                else:
       [esp+8], eax
mov
       [esp], edi
mov
                                   [esi+0x84] = 0x237EEAD6
       edi, [ebp+var 21116]
1ea
call
       memcpy
       edx, [ebp+var 2118C]
mov
lea.
       eax, [esi+4]
       [esp+4], edi
mov
                                memcpy([esi+4], sig, siglen)
mov
       edi, esi
       [esp], eax
mov
mov
       [esp+8], edx
call
       memcpy
                                if [esi+0x84] == 0x237EEAD6:
       esi, [esi]
MOV
       eax, [ebp+var 21190]
mov
                                          // signature is valid
CMP
       dword ptr [edi+84h], 237EEAD6h
       byte ptr [esi+eax], 0
mov
jnz
       1oc 401E93
       dword ptr [esp], offset aSignatureIsVal ; "*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****"
mov
call
       puts
       [esp+4], esi
mov
       dword ptr [esp], offset aMessageS ; "Message: %s\n"
mov
       printf
call
       dword ptr [esp], offset aSignatureIsVal ; "*****SIGNATURE IS VALID*****"
mov
call
       puts
```

#### A problem

'M' | len data2 | len data1 | 0x3A2B | data1 | data2

```
esi = ox88 bytes of malloc'd mem
if RSA_verify returns <= o:
    [esi+ox84] = o
else:
```

[esi+ox84] = ox237EEAD6

memcpy([esi+4], sig, siglen)

if [esi+ox84] == ox237EEAD6: // signature is valid Both are set by
Base64Decode, based
on 'data2' and 'len
data2'

#### A problem

'M' | len data2 | len data1 | 0x3A2B | data1 | data2

esi = ox88 bytes of malloc'd mem

if RSA\_verify returns <= o:

$$[esi+ox84] = o$$

else:

$$[esi+ox84] = ox237EEAD6$$

memcpy([esi+4], sig, siglen)

if [esi+ox84] == ox237EEAD6:

// signature is valid

If siglen is greater than ox8o, the memcpy will overwrite the signature verification value with data from sig

To exploit, craft data2 such that base64 decodes into a buffer with 0x237EEAD6 at byte 0x80

#### An alternate solution...

- Recall:
  - Intelligence suggests ... a customized cryptographic implementation is used to generate a public/private key pair, which is then used to authenticate messages from leadership
- Maybe there's a problem with the keys...

#### With your powers combined

- Task 1: public key for high-ranking member
- Task 2: public key for field operative
- From Wikipedia, regarding attacks on the RSA cryptosystem:

If n = pq is one public key and n' = p'q' is another, then if by chance p = p' ... then a simple computation of gcd(n,n') = p factors both n and n', totally compromising both keys.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA\_(cryptosystem)#Security\_and\_practical\_considerations

# The keys share a common factor ©

- Computing the GCD on both keys reveals the private key to both
- This can be used to sign a message to either recipient
- Idea for this attack:
  - 2012 research paper from U of Mich:

We were able to remotely obtain the RSA private keys for 0.50% of TLS hosts and 0.03% of SSH hosts because their public keys shared nontrivial common factors due to poor randomness.

#### Task 4 Complete!

- Required:
  - Exploiting the four-byte buffer overflow vuln, or
  - Computing the GCD of the provided public keys

#### Questions

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... if this work interests you, consider applying for an internship or full-time position at <a href="https://www.intelligencecareers.gov/NSA">https://www.intelligencecareers.gov/NSA</a>

Check the site for an event code to use when applying (to associate yourself with the Codebreaker Challenge)